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RETHINKING THE ROLE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
REGARDING THE RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATIONS IN NEW YORK
SCOTT WOLLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Assume you are on trial for murder in New York.  The govern-
ment’s case consists solely of the testimony of three eyewitnesses
who say you are the killer.  All three witnesses initially identified you
from a photograph, and one also picked you at a lineup.  These
pretrial identifications took place seven years after the commission
of the crime.  One of the witnesses, when viewing the photo, said it
was a “close match”, and another said it was only “similar.”  Yet, you
were indicted and brought to trial.  Your attorney calls a psycholo-
gist who is an expert on eyewitness identification.1  The court ref-
uses to admit the testimony however, citing the Frye test, an archaic
doctrine formulated in 1923 to determine the admissibility of
“novel” scientific evidence.2  In New York, the decision to admit ex-
pert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony is in the
discretion of the trial court.3  Thus, if the defendant is unlucky, the
judge may strictly apply Frye and refuse to allow an expert to testify.4
If the defendant is lucky, the court may hold Frye inapplicable and
admit the expert testimony.5
This Note argues that because of the many psychological fac-
tors that may make eyewitness identification unreliable, New York
should either (1) stop applying Frye to expert testimony on the reli-
ability of eyewitnesses or alternatively, hold such testimony satisfies
the Frye test; or (2) adopt the test set out by the Supreme Court in
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, June 2004.  The author would like to
thank Professors Donald Zeigler and Tanina Rostain for their help in writing this Note.
1. This is the factual and procedural background of People v. Legrand, 747
N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002), which will be discussed infra.
2. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3. People v. Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63 (2001) (holding that “. . . the decision whether
to admit [expert testimony] rests in the sound discretion of the trial court”).
4. See Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
5. People v. Smith, 743 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
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324 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.6 for the admission of ex-
pert testimony.
Part II of the Note discusses the history of the admissibility of
expert testimony regarding eyewitness reliability, both nationally
and in New York.  It traces the traditional universal refusal to admit
such testimony and the more recent willingness of some courts to
allow it. Part II also discusses the different standards courts have
used in deciding admissibility.  Part III will highlight the recent ex-
perience in the New York courts and some of the problems with
eyewitness testimony subject to expert testimony.  Finally, in Part IV
the Note will propose a solution and respond to some of the likely
criticisms of adopting Daubert.
II. HISTORY OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
REGARDING EYEWITNESS RELIABILITY
A. The Early Rejection of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification
The earliest reported decision concerning expert testimony on
eyewitness identification is Criglow v. State,7 decided in 1931.8  The
defendant Criglow sought to call an expert to give his opinion as to
the powers of observation and recollection of two eyewitnesses,
neither of whom had ever seen the defendant prior to the robbery.9
The trial court excluded this testimony, and the Supreme Court of
Arkansas affirmed.  The court held that such testimony would
usurp the function of the jury to pass upon the credibility and
weight of evidence.10  In 1952, a California appellate court in People
6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. 36 S.W.2d 400 (Ark. 1931).  R.E. Criglow and two other men were arrested
and charged with robbing a store in Pulaski County, Arkansas.  Two witnesses testified
at trial that they recognized the defendant as one of the robbers.
8. See Steven D. Penrod et al., Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Reliability
Before and After Daubert: The State of the Law and Science, 13 BEHAV. SCI. AND L. 229, 230
(1995).
9. Criglow, 36 S.W.2d at 401.
10. Id.  (“[T]he question whether these witnesses were mistaken in their identifi-
cation, whether from fright or other cause, was one which the jury, and not an expert
witness, should answer.”). In addition, the court reasoned that the extent to which the
witnesses might have been frightened and their opportunity to observe the defendant
during the robbery were questions that could have been inquired into by examination
of the witnesses themselves. Id.
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2003] THE RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 325
v. Collier11 followed the reasoning of Criglow.  When the defendant
sought to call a psychology professor to testify as to the reliability of
the victims’ observation, the court found that the evidence was not
within the “proper field of expert testimony”12 and that it “was a
matter within the province of the jury.”13  An influential 1973 Ninth
Circuit case, United States v. Amaral,14 also echoed this reasoning,
stating the jury should determine what weight to give an eyewitness’
testimony rather than an expert.15
Courts also excluded expert testimony about an eyewitness’ re-
liability on the ground that problems with eyewitness identification
could be brought out on cross-examination.16 Criglow, Collier, and
Amaral all offered this rationale, as did other cases declining to al-
low expert testimony.17  Some courts also expressed a concern that
an expert’s testimony would be highly prejudicial because of the
undue weight lay jurors would give it.18
11. 249 P.2d 72 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). Collier was a prosecution in which the
defendant was charged with raping four different women, all of whom testified that the
defendant was the man who raped them.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
15. Id. at 1153.  This reasoning, that the problems which could make an eyewit-
ness’ testimony unreliable were within the common knowledge, or “province” of the
jury, and that such testimony would usurp the fact finding function became the staple
holding for courts declining to allow expert testimony on eyewitness identifications. See
e.g., id.; People v. Johnson, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1974) (upholding the trial court’s
ruling “that the testimony would take over the jury’s task of determining the weight and
credibility of the witnesses testimony.”); Jones v. State, 208 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1974) (“The
determination of the credibility of a witness, including the accuracy of an eyewitness’
identification, is a matter exclusively within the jury’s province.”); United States v. The-
vis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982) (“jury can adequately weigh these problems
through common-sense evaluation”); United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th
Cir. 1992) (expert testimony regarding reliability of eyewitness testimony addresses an
issue of which the jury is already aware).
16. See, e.g., Thevis, 665 F.2d at 641 (“We conclude, as did the trial judge, that the
problems of perception and memory can be adequately addressed in cross-
examination. . .”).
17. See, e.g., Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1153 (“It is the responsibility of counsel during
cross-examination to inquire into the witness’ opportunity for observation, his capacity
for observation, his attention and interest and his distraction or division of attention.”).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (expert
testimony would cause undue prejudice and confusion because of the special reliability
and trustworthiness of an expert’s testimony).
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Interestingly, most courts that denied the use of expert testi-
mony on eyewitness reliability did so without even mentioning the
Frye “general acceptance” test, which was the dominant test for the
admissibility of expert scientific evidence at least until the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.19  Only three of the early cases
denying the use of such expert testimony mentioned Frye and gen-
eral acceptance, and two of those cases did not even consider
whether such testimony satisfied the general acceptance standard.20
In Bloodsworth v. Maryland,21 the Maryland Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged the Frye-Reed standard was appropriate for evidence
such as voice-prints and hypnosis,22 but held that it was inappropri-
ate for expert evidence on eyewitness reliability.23  This court rea-
soned that eyewitness reliability “was not beyond the ken of the
jurors. . .”24  Thus, there were no cases excluding such testimony for
failure to meet the Frye general acceptance standard.
In more recent cases, most appellate courts take the view that
the admittance of such expert testimony is within the discretion of
the trial court, and will rarely review the decision of a trial judge
who excludes the expert testimony.25  Trial courts thus have broad
leeway in how they deal with expert testimony pertaining to the reli-
19. Adopted in 1975 and last amended in 2000.  Rule 702 is the rule that deals
with the admission of expert evidence and creates a more liberal standard than the Frye
general acceptance standard.  In 1993, the Supreme Court held in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), that Rule 702 supplanted Frye, and developed what
has become known as the Daubert test.
20. See, e.g., Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383 (declining to address the general acceptance
question because the defendant, in his offer of the expert testimony, did not address
it); Amaral, 448 F.2d at 1153 (“We do not reach the question, even assuming our com-
petency to pass on it, whether the proffered testimony was in accordance with the gen-
erally accepted theory explaining the mechanism of perception.”).
21. 512 A.2d 1056 (1986).
22. Id. Reed is Maryland’s version of the general acceptance test based on the Fyre
test.  Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978) (holding the standard in Maryland for
admission of expert evidence is taken from Frye, 293 F. 1013).  The trial judge in Blood-
sworth, 512 A.2d 1056, applied the Frye-Reed test and denied the use of the expert
testimony.
23. Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 184. (stating “[w]e agree that the Frye-Reed test is not
properly applicable to this evidence.”).
24. Id. at 183.
25. See, e.g., McMullen v. Florida, 714 So. 2d 368, 370 (1998) (stating that “[a]n
overwhelming majority of both federal and state courts” have adopted this “discretion-
ary view, which provides that the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification is in the discretion of the trial judge.” (citations omitted).
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ability of an eyewitness.  Trial courts that continue to exclude such
evidence rely on several rationales.  Some use the traditional rea-
soning that such evidence is not beyond the knowledge of a jury
and would not assist them in making their decision.26  Other courts
exclude such testimony because the defendant can present scien-
tific bases concerning eyewitness fallibility in jury instructions,27 be-
cause the expert’s testimony was not applicable to the issues at
hand,28 or because the defendant adequately addressed the issue in
cross-examination and closing arguments.29  Finally, some courts
still hold such testimony to be inadmissible per se.30
B. A Growing Acceptance of Expert Testimony
on Eyewitness Identification
In more recent times, the attitudes of some judges have begun
to change.  By the 1960’s, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized
the deficiencies in eyewitness testimony.31  The adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 led to an increasing acceptance
of expert testimony generally.  Rule 702 liberalized the admissibility
of expert witness testimony.32  Under Rule 702, expert witnesses
may explain scientific or other principles that are relevant to the
case and leave it to the trier of fact to apply those principles to the
26. See, e.g., State v. Hubbard, 48 P.3d 953 (Utah 2002) (upholding the trial
judge’s finding that such testimony would have “amount[ed] to a lecture to the jury as
to how they should weigh testimonial evidence.”); State v. Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112, 133
(1999) (it is a “widely held common sense view that members of one race have greater
difficulty . . . identifying members of a different race, [therefore] an expert’s testimony
would not assist the jury.” (citations omitted)); Green v. U.S, 718 A.2d 1042 (D.C. 1998)
(“[P]roffered expert testimony did not deal with subject matter beyond the ken of an
average juror.”).
27. See, e.g., State v. Maestas, 63 P.3d 621 (Utah 2002); State v. Miles, 585 N.W.2d
368 (Minn. 1998).
28. State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107 (Conn. 1999).
29. Parker v. State, 968 S.W.2d. 592 (Ark. 1998).
30. State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. 2002).
31. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mis-
taken identification.”).
32. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (explaining
that Rule 702 is part of the “liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules of Evidence and their
“general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony”; quoting
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEIN-
STEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1997) (“Rule 702 reflects an attempt to liberalize the
rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony.”).
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facts of the case.33  Rule 702 requires only that the expert evidence
be reliable,34 be helpful to the trier of fact,35 and assist the trier in
reaching its decision.36
Under Rule 702, expert testimony concerning a subject within
the common knowledge of the jury would not assist the jury in
reaching a decision and therefore would generally not be permit-
ted.37  In some instances, however, experts may still assist the trier
of fact in deciding an issue even if the subject is within the common
knowledge.38  Some courts have taken the position, in following the
liberal thrust of Rule 702, that “doubts about whether an expert’s
testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in favor of ad-
missibility.”39  This is a significant departure from the common law
where expert testimony was admissible only if necessary because the
issue was one of science or skill so far beyond the ken of the average
juror as to be incomprehensible without benefit of an expert.40
State v. Chapple was one of the first cases where a court allowed
the use of expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness testi-
mony.41  The Arizona Supreme Court followed the criteria set out
in United States v. Amaral, which at the time was the leading case on
the issue.  Those criteria were: (1) whether the witness was a quali-
fied expert; (2) whether the testimony was the proper subject for an
33. FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee Note (1972); FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory
Committee Note (2000).
34. Id. The reliability criterion was first outlined by the Supreme Court in Daubert,
and Rule 702 was amended in 2000 to include these criteria.
35. WEINSTEIN, supra note 32 at §702.02[3] (“The first prerequisite. . .helpfulness
to the finder of fact, has been in effect since the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975.”).
36. Id. (“The second prerequisite. . .assistance, has also been in effect since the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.”).
37. Id. at §702.03[2][a].
38. Id. at §702.03[2][b].
39. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 279 (3rd Cir.
1983). See also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), Larabree
v. M M & L Int’l Corp., 896 F.2d 1112 (1990).
40. Dougherty v. Milliken, 57 N.E. 757, 759 (N.Y. 1900).
41. 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983).  This was a landmark decision, because until this
case, no appellate court had reversed a trial court’s decision to exclude such testimony.
Although I have no evidence of this, I cannot find one case where this occurred.  In
addition, the court stated that it recognized the fact that the cases that had considered
the subject had uniformly affirmed trial court rulings denying the admission of this type
of testimony. Id. at 291.
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expert; (3) whether it conformed to a generally accepted explana-
tory theory; and (4) weighing the probative value compared to prej-
udicial effect.42 However, unlike Amaral and the cases following it,
the court here found that the criteria were met based upon the
specific facts of the case.43
Under Arizona’s Rule 702,44 the court found that an expert
may testify to general factors that were applicable to the case and
might affect the reliability of the witnesses, but not to the accuracy
of the specific identifications made by the witnesses.45  The court
disagreed with courts disallowing expert testimony on eyewitness re-
liability because the matter is within the common knowledge of the
jury.  The court reasoned that Rule 702 only requires an expert’s
testimony to assist the jury in determining an issue.46  Because the
testimony would assist the trier of fact, Rule 702 was satisfied and
thus was a proper subject for an expert.
Almost two years later, in People v. McDonald,47 the Supreme
Court of California reversed a trial court ruling excluding the de-
fendant’s expert witness from testifying on the psychological factors
that may affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification.48  Al-
though California has no “702 type” evidence rule,49 the court’s
analysis was very similar to that of the Chapple court.  First, the ex-
42. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1153.
43. Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1218 (“We approve [the Amaral] test and find that the
case at bar meets these criteria.”).
44. Arizona’s Rule 702 is almost identical to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, and states: “a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” ARIZ.
REV. STAT. R. 702 (2003).
45. Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1219 (“Rule 702 recognizes that an expert on the stand
may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the
case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.”).
46. The court stated “while most jurors would no doubt realize that memory dims
as time passes” and “assuming jurors of ordinary education need no expert testimony to
enlighten them to the danger of eyewitness identification . . .  [w]e cannot assume that
the average juror would be aware of the variables concerning identification and mem-
ory about which [the expert] was qualified to testify.” Id. at 1220-221.
47. 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984) McDonald was a murder prosecution where the only
evidence against the defendant was the testimony of four witnesses, and in each wit-
ness’s testimony there were factors that could have raised doubts as to the reliability of
the identifications.
48. Id. at 711.
49. California’s rule dealing with experts is CAL. EVID. CODE §801 (2004).
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pert was going to testify merely to various factors that could affect an
eyewitness’s identification, not to whether any particular witness
might be mistaken.50  Second, the court rejected the objection that
such testimony was within the common experience of the jury, stat-
ing: “[T]he jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter
of the opinion in order to justify its admission: if that were the test,
little expert opinion testimony would ever be heard.”51  Instead, the
testimony should be admitted whenever it would assist the jury.52
Finally, the court held that the Frye-Kelly53 general acceptance rule
applies only to novel scientific devices or processes that possess an
“aura of infallibility,”54 not to the testimony of a person giving his
opinion, even if he qualifies as an expert.55
In United States v. Downing,56 the Third Circuit also remanded a
case because the trial court refused to admit the defendant’s expert
when the conviction was based solely on eyewitness identifications.
The court briefly discussed Chapple, McDonald and United States v.
Smith,57 and concluded that under certain circumstances, expert
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications can assist
the jury and meet the helpfulness requirement of Rule 702.58  In
50. McDonald, 690 P.2d at 715-17.
51. Id. at 720.
52. Id. at 720.
It is doubtless true that from personal experience and intuition all jurors
know that an eyewitness identification can be mistaken, and also know the
more obvious factors that can affect its accuracy, such as lighting, distance,
and duration.  It appears from the professional literature, however, that
other factors bearing on eyewitness identification may be known only to
some jurors, or may be imperfectly understood by many, or may be contrary
to the intuitive beliefs of most.
Id.
53. Id. at 724. Kelly is the California version of the Frye general acceptance test,
and it comes from People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
54. “[S]uch as lie detectors, truth serum, Nalline testing, experimental systems of
blood typing, voiceprints, identification by human bite marks, microscopic analysis of
gunshot residue, and hypnosis.” Id. at 724 (internal quotes omitted).
55. Id. at 723-24.
56. 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. 1985).
57. 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984).  The Court held that the district court’s error of
not allowing a defense expert to testify as to problems with eyewitness identifications
was harmless, although it did acknowledge that in some circumstances, such testimony
would meet the “helpfulness” standard of Rule 702. Id. at 1107-1108.
58. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1231.
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 169 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 169 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR207.txt unknown Seq: 9 16-APR-04 11:57
2003] THE RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 331
addition, the court noted that cross-examination is not always an
effective way to attack an eyewitness’ credibility.59
Following these seminal cases, additional courts held that ex-
pert testimony regarding the problems with eyewitness identifica-
tions could assist the jury and was thus admissible, either under a
state rule or Federal Rule 702.60  Two of these cases expressly ad-
dressed the Frye issue.  In Cambell v. Colorado,61 the Colorado Su-
preme Court held the trial court erred when it relied on Frye to
exclude the testimony.62 Frye, the court stated, has been “employed
as a special foundational requirement for novel scientific devices or
process.”63  With eyewitness identification expert testimony, by con-
trast, “we deal with no such scientific device or process.  Rather, the
testimony concerns an explanation by a psychologist on how certain
factors, such as stress and post-event information, can affect mem-
ory and perception, and thus eyewitness identification.”64  In State v.
Whaley,65 the South Carolina court similarly held that this type of
expert testimony was “distinguishable from ‘scientific’ evidence,
such as DNA test results, blood splatter interpretation, and bite
59. Id. at 1231 n.6 (“[t]o the extent that a mistaken witness may retain great confi-
dence in an inaccurate identification, cross-examination can hardly be seen as an effec-
tive way to reveal the weakness in a witness’[sic] recollection of an event.”).  This case is
also important as a precursor of Daubert as the court spends considerable time discuss-
ing the Frye general acceptance test and its applicability after the adoption of Rule 702.
After considering some of the praise and the criticism of the Frye test, as well as its
relation to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court rejected “general acceptance” as an
independent test for the admissibility of scientific evidence, saying “Frye . . . should be
rejected as an independent controlling standard of admissibility.” Id. at 1237.  Instead,
the general acceptance of a scientific technique could be a factor when determining
the reliability of such evidence under Rule 702. Id.  However, the Court went on to
say, based on the record and otherwise, that the scientific evidence on the reliability of
eyewitness testimony was sufficiently reliable.
60. See Cambell v. Colorado, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1991); State v. Whaley, 406 S.E.2d
369 (S.C. 1991); State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1997); United States v. Stevens,
935 F.2d 1380 (3rd Cir. 1991).
61. 814 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1991).
62. Id. at 8 (“the court found that the studies relied on by Dr. Green did not
provide a ‘scientifically established standard’ and stated that it was applying the Frye test
to deny her testimony”).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 406 S.E.2d 369 (1991).
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mark comparison,” and therefore was not required to meet the Frye
test.66
In sum, in recent years many courts have admitted expert testi-
mony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.  In addition, all
of the courts that have addressed the issue have held that such evi-
dence need not meet the general acceptance standard of Frye.
C. The New York Experience
Only a few New York cases have considered the admissibility of
expert testimony on eyewitness reliability.  The reasons proffered
for and against admissibility mirror the reasons given in other juris-
dictions.  In People v. Valentine,67 a short Appellate Division opinion,
the court held that “expert opinions were not necessary to enable
the jury to comprehend the potential for unreliability,” and that to
allow such testimony would constitute “trespass on the jury’s do-
main.”68  Several other cases followed similar reasoning, holding
that such expert testimony is a matter of “common knowledge not
beyond the ken of lay jurors” and that deficiencies in the accuracy
of identifications can be conveyed to the jury through cross-exami-
nation, closing arguments, and instructions to the jury.69  In only
one case, People v. Brown,70 did a court deny the use of an expert on
eyewitness testimony and expressly mention Frye or general
acceptance.71
66. Id. at 371.  The court also stated that such testimony is admissible where, as in
the case, “the sole evidence of identity is eyewitness identification.” Id. at 372. See also,
United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 316 (2000)  (stating that “there is no question
that many aspects of perception and memory are not within the common knowledge of
most jurors, and in fact, many factors that affect memory are counter-intuitive”); Com-
monwealth v. Christie, 2002 WL 31887744 (Ky. 2002) (holding that “where identity is a
crucial and closely contested issue and where critical testimony is given by people who
did not know the perpetrator and had only a short time to see him or were distracted by
other factors, expert testimony seems more clearly warranted”).
67. 385 N.Y.S.2d 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
68. Id. at 546.
69. People v. Slack, 516 N.Y.S.2d 309 (N.Y App. Div. 1987). See also People v.
Brown, 479 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (Westchester County Ct. 1984); People v. Gibbs, 550
N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); People v. Wright, 558 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990).
70. 459 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Westchester County Ct. 1983).
71. The court stated that “there was no showing that [the expert’s] research has
reached the level of general acceptance in the field of scientific inquiry.” Id. at 593
(citing Frye, 293 F. 1013).
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A few cases have gone the other way. People v. Brooks,72 for ex-
ample, relied on two Court of Appeals decisions, People v. Cronin73
and De Long v. County of Erie,74 for the principle that expert opin-
ions could be used to “clarify an issue calling for professional or
technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken
of the typical juror.”75  The court stated that expert opinion eyewit-
ness testimony met this standard, and that the expert would assist
the jury “by bringing to their attention scientific studies with which
they would not otherwise be familiar.”76 Brooks thus applied similar
reasoning to the courts in other jurisdictions permitting such testi-
mony.  The court did not, however, mention Frye.
It was not until People v. Mooney77 that the Court of Appeals
considered this issue.  The majority did not resolve it,78 relying
upon the “sound discretion of the trial court” to avoid actually tak-
ing a position.79  Judge Kaye’s dissent, by contrast, addressed the
issue head-on.  She attacked all three reasons the trial court gave
for excluding the expert testimony on the reliability of the eyewit-
nesses.80  First, Judge Kaye questioned whether the general accept-
ance standard of Frye should apply to this type of expert evidence at
all:
72. 490 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Westchester County Ct. 1985).
73. 458 N.E.2d 351 (N.Y. 1983).
74. 457 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. 1983).
75. Brooks, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (citing De Long, 60 N.Y.2d at 307).
76. Id. (the court limited the testimony, ruling that the expert would not be per-
mitted to give an opinion on whether the particular witness in question was or was not
reliable, emphasizing that was the job of the jury).  The few other courts allowing such
expert testimony all followed reasoning, holding that the subject of the testimony was
not known to the common juror, and that the jury’s function would not be usurped
because jurors were free to reject the expert’s findings. See People v. Beckford, 532
N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); see also People v. Lewis, 520 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127
(Monroe County Ct. 1987); People v. Drake, 728 N.Y.S.2d 636, 640 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
77. 559 N.E.2d 1274 (N.Y. 1990).
78. Id. at 1274 (“On this appeal, we need not decide whether the expert testimony
sought to be presented was of the type that could, as a matter of law, properly be
admitted.”).
79. Id. (“Here, the trial court based its decision to exclude the testimony in the
exercise of its sound discretion to which such evidence would, if legally admissible at all,
be entrusted.” (emphasis added)).
80. Id. (“The trial court’s error is evident upon review of its three unelaborated
reasons.”).
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[E]ven if that test is applicable to the results of certain
processes such as lie detectors, voiceprints and hypnosis
. . . it does not necessarily follow that it is the appropriate
standard to be applied to the testimony of a qualified psy-
chologist who proposes to explain to the jury how certain
factors shown by the record can affect perception and
memory, and thus the accuracy of identification
testimony.81
Next, Judge Kaye argued that even if Frye governs, such evi-
dence arguably is generally accepted.82  She also rejected as “make-
shift reasoning” the argument that the reliability of eyewitness
testimony is not a proper subject for expert testimony because the
matter is within the ken of the average juror.83  Judge Kaye con-
cluded that even if such testimony was not beyond the jury’s ken, it
still would be admissible to clarify the jury’s general awareness of
the issue.84
Subsequently, the 1994 Court of Appeals case of People v. Wes-
ley,85 although not dealing with eyewitness expert testimony, held
that the Frye test was the proper standard in New York for the ad-
missibility of expert scientific evidence.  The court upheld the trial
court’s use of the Frye test and held that DNA evidence was not
generally accepted and thus not admissible.86  The court also stated
that Daubert did not apply because Daubert only dealt with federal
courts and the Federal Rules of Evidence.87
In 2001, the Court of Appeals reconsidered the issue of expert
testimony on eyewitness reliability in People v. Lee.88  Although the
court again upheld the denial of the use of such evidence, the court
appeared to be a bit more receptive to its admission.  First, the
81. Id. at 1275 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
82. Id. (“As the cited courts and commentators have found, psychological re-
search data is by now abundant, and the findings based upon it concerning cognitive
factors that may affect identification are quite uniform and well documented.”).
83. Mooney, 559 N.E.2d 1274 (citing MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 206, at 624 (Cleary
3d ed.).
84. Id.
85. 83 N.Y.2d 417 (1994).
86. Id. at 425.
87. Id. at 423 n.2.
88. 750 N.E.2d 63 (N.Y. 2001).
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court recognized that such testimony is not inadmissible per se.89
Second, and more important, the court opened the door partially
by rejecting the argument that such testimony is within the knowl-
edge of jurors.  The court stated that while jurors may be familiar
with factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness identification, “it
cannot be said that psychological studies regarding the accuracy of
an identification are within the ken of the typical juror.”90  How-
ever, this encouraging language was followed by the qualification
that before allowing such testimony, “a trial court may need to de-
termine whether the proffered expert testimony is generally accepted
by the relevant scientific community.”91  This obviously adopted
Frye as the standard of admission, which may cause more problems
than it solves.
After Lee, three New York trial courts have considered this issue
with inconsistent results.  In the first case, People v. Radcliffe,92 the
court neither denied nor granted the defendant’s request to call
the expert witness.93  The court first recognized that New York law
was unclear.94  The court then listed five questions that must be
addressed in an application to admit expert opinion testimony.95
89. Id. at 65.
90. Id. at 66.  This was important because as we have seen, most courts in New
York and elsewhere, have relied on that very argument to consistently deny the use of
expert testimony on eyewitness reliability.
91. Id.
92. People v. Radcliffe, 743 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
93. Id. at 235 (the court decided to hold the defendant’s application in abeyance
and to give the defendant an opportunity to supplement the application according to
the court’s opinion, which set out its own inquiry as to whether expert testimony should
be admissible).
94. Id. at 232.  The court asked itself “what procedure should be followed and
what information should a court consider in order to determine whether to admit ex-
pert identification testimony?” Id.  It then went on to say that  “at least until the law of
New York settles on the parameters of expert identification testimony, the application
for the admission of such testimony should be made pretrial because the trial court may
need to conduct a hearing and that cannot be conveniently done during a trial.” Id.
95. Id.
An application to admit expert identification testimony should: (1) to the
extent known set forth the pertinent alleged facts of the identification and
any corroborative evidence; (2) set forth the name and qualifications of the
witness and the proffered testimony; (3) correlate the proffered testimony
with the facts of the case to demonstrate the relevance of the expert testi-
mony; (4) explain whether the testimony involves “novel scientific theories and
techniques,” and if it does, include an offer of proof as to its general acceptance
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The defendant’s application did not address these questions, so the
court allowed the defendant time to supplement the application.  It
was clear, however, that the court considered the general accept-
ance of the proposed testimony a relevant factor.
In the next case, People v. Smith,96 the court admitted an ex-
pert’s testimony.  Judge Yates avoided Frye by holding that it simply
does not apply to this type of evidence.  He stated that the factors
affecting eyewitness memory and perception are not “novel” scien-
tific theories, and therefore a Frye determination was unnecessary.97
According to Judge Yates, the expert merely described academic
research and writings in a recognized field of study, just as with
other types of expert testimony that are permitted without a Frye
hearing.98  Judge Yates interpreted Lee to require only that the
judge “weigh the request [for expert testimony] against other rele-
vant factors, such as the centrality of the identification issue and the
existence of corroborating evidence.”99  He did not believe that the
general acceptance of the expert’s testimony was applicable.100 Be-
cause the prosecution’s case was solely dependant on eyewitness
identifications, with no other evidence, the testimony was rele-
vant.101
in the relevant scientific community; and (5) explain why the testimony is
warranted if an existing standard jury instruction would appear to cover the
area of the proffered expert testimony. (emphasis added).
96. 743 N.Y.S. 2d 246 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
97. Id. at 248.
The broad field of study involving subjective and objective factors which
may affect the reliability of an identification does not necessarily depend
upon any particularly novel experiment or technique, but instead describes
observations and studies by a wide range of scholars who have observed and
examined cognizable behavioral patterns connected with the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony.
Smith is consistent with the cases from other jurisdictions admitting this type of evi-
dence and refusing to apply the Frye test. See, e.g., the discussion of Cambell, 814 P.2d 1,
supra p. 333.
98. See Smith, 743 N.Y.S. 2d at 248 (citing cases outlining this point of view).
99. Id. at 249 (citing Lee, 726 N.Y.S. 2d at 365).
100. Id. at 250.  Judge Yates “respectfully disagreed” with other New York courts
that held such testimony subject to the general acceptance standard. Id.  Doing so,
Judge Yates said, would “distinguish expert testimony in this area from other expert
testimony.” Id.
101. Id at 249. (“In this case, there is no corroborating evidence . . . As such, apply-
ing the Lee test, i.e. weighing the centrality of the identification issue and the (lack of)
corroborating evidence, the Court is impelled to permit Dr. Fulero’s testimony.”).
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The last of the three cases, People v. Legrand,102 recognized the
inconsistency between Radcliffe and Smith,103 and interpreted Lee to
require a pretrial hearing to consider if the Frye general acceptance
standard was satisfied.104  After a thorough discussion of the ex-
pert’s qualifications, the subjects of his proposed testimony, and
contradictory research, the judge held that general acceptance had
not been reached and that an “energized debate” existed on exactly
the issue of whether the principles are generally accepted.105  Thus,
the proposed expert testimony was excluded because the judge
found that it was not generally accepted.
This decision was unusual because most courts refusing to ad-
mit expert testimony in this area have done so on the grounds that
it “will not assist the trier of fact.”106  We have seen already that
most of the courts deciding the issue do not even discuss general
acceptance, let alone hold that the evidence does not meet this
standard.  A strict general acceptance standard makes it very hard
for evidence to be admitted, and, as Professor D. Michael Risinger
noted, “under [Judge] Fried’s interpretation, virtually no expert
testimony from any field of social science would ever be
admitted.”107
102. 747 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
103. Id. at 738. (“I am aware of two trial court opinions, decided after Lee, which
have split on the issue of requisite procedures and necessary information to decide the
admissibility of expert identification testimony.”).
104. Id. at 740 (holding that “hearing was required . . . once a pretrial hearing has
been determined to be necessary, [and] the trial judge must apply the four-fold test for
the admissibility of scientific expert evidence, as set forth in Frye v. United States.”).
105. Id. at 757.  In reaching his conclusion, Judge Fried stated:
This is not a debate among experts about a generally accepted principle.
Rather, It is a real controversy among the relevant experts concerning
whether these principles are generally accepted. Thus, it is the current state
of disagreement, and inconclusiveness, and the problems of external valid-
ity associated with the research, i.e., transposition to a courtroom setting,
that leads me to conclude that this proffered evidence has not been gener-
ally accepted within the relevant psychological community.
106. Mark Hansen, Expertise on Trial: Testimony on Reliability of Eyewitness Identification
Stalls on General Acceptance, 88 A.B.A. J. 22 (2002) (“Legal experts say [Judge] Fried’s
decision is unusual . . . [as o]nly a few courts have excluded such testimony on the
grounds of general acceptance.  And in that respect, [Judge] Fried may have gone fur-
ther than anybody else.”).
107. Id.
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III. THE CASE FOR LIBERAL ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
While the use of experts to testify as to the problems with eye-
witness testimony has only recently been allowed by some courts,
the shortcomings of eyewitness identifications have been known for
a long time.108  Even the ancient Greeks were aware that eyewitness
testimony may be unreliable.109  One of the most famous cases of
mistaken identity occurred in the 1896 English trial of Adolf
Beck.110  Beck was convicted based on the identifications of ten
women.111  He maintained his innocence, and after it was discov-
ered that Beck had spent seven years in prison for a crime he did
not commit, a committee was formed to investigate.  The commit-
tee found that “evidence as to identity based on personal impres-
sions, however bona fide, is perhaps of all classes of evidence the
least to be relied upon, and therefore, unless supported by other
facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict of a jury.”112
About 25 years after the Beck trial, the infamous trial of Sacco
and Vanzetti took place here in America.  The two were accused of
murdering and robbing a factory cashier and his bodyguard.  A jury
convicted the two men based on very suspect eyewitness testimony,
108. As one author wrote in the early 1890’s, “[a]t first the question of personal
identity might seem to be the simplest that could possibly come before a court.  But the
fact is precisely the reverse . . . the question whether a . . . man . . . is one individual or
another, has proved itself over and over again, by far, the most perplexing.  Cases of
mistaken personal identity have been all but innumerable.” PATRICK M. WALL, EYEWIT-
NESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES, 6 (1965), citing New York Medico-Legal Papers
367 (3d ser.), quoting HARRIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IDENTIFICATION § 622 n. at 435-
36 (1892).
109. PLATO, PORTRAIT OF SOCRATES, BEING THE APOLOGY, CRITO, AND PHAEDO OF
PLATO (R.W. Livingstone ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1938), cited in Hallisey, Experts on Eye-
witness Testimony in Court – A Short Historical Perspective, 39 HOW. L.J. 237, 237 (“Have
sight and hearing in them?  Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate
witnesses?”).
110. A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 4 (1979); for an
account of the Beck trial, see WATSON, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF BECK (1924).
111. Beck was arrested and accused of “obtaining jewelry and money on false pre-
tenses from loose women.” YARMEY, supra note 110 at 4.  He was convicted and spent 7
years in prison, all the while maintaining his innocence.  He claimed he was mistaken
for a man named John Smith.  While Beck was still in prison, more of these offenses
occurred.  Smith was eventually arrested and Beck was released. YARMEY, supra note 110
at 4.
112. WATSON, supra note 110, at 250.
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and they were later executed.113  Felix Frankfurter, while still a pro-
fessor at Harvard, wrote a book on the case, stating, “[t]he identifi-
cation of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.  The hazards of
such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances
in the records of English and American trials.”114  The recognition
that wrongful identifications continue to cause the convictions of
innocent defendants persists today.  A 1983 study estimated that
half of all wrongful convictions result from false identifications.115
Many critics cite the research of Harvard Professor Hugo Mun-
sterberg from the early 1900’s as the first major application of be-
havioral science to eyewitness evidence in this country.116  In his
book, On the Witness Stand,117 Professor Munsterberg republished a
collection of articles he had written describing his research.  He be-
lieved that certain psychological mechanisms that were not com-
monly understood operated when eyewitness testimony was
presented and that experimental psychologists could help shed
light on them.118  Munstenberg acknowledged that in situations
where eyewitness testimony is presented, judges had “psychologised
on their own account; but to consult the psychological authorities
was out of the question.”119  He argued that this practice should
change, and, as he said, “. . .my only purpose is to turn the attention
of serious men to an absurdly neglected field which demands the
full attention of the social community.”120
113. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, 1-3 (1979).
114. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1927), cited in WALL,
supra note 108, at 6. See also, WILDER & WENTWORTH, PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION 37
(1918) (stating that “[c]ases of mistaken identity are alarmingly frequent, and . . . crimi-
nal history is full of cases in which, by relying upon such uncertain testimony, innocent
men have been compelled to serve long terms of imprisonment, or to submit even to
the extreme penalty of the law.”), quoted in WALL, supra note 108, at 7; EDWARD
BOCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932) (collection of twenty-nine stories in which
inaccurate eyewitness identifications led to wrongful convictions), cited in WALL, supra
note 108, at 6 n.3.
115. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Witness, 10 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 241, 243 (1986) (citing a 1983 Ohio State University doctoral dissertation).
116. Hallisey, supra note 109 at 242.
117. HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND
CRIME (1923).
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 12.
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Based on his studies, Munsterberg believed that witness obser-
vations were filled with “chaos and confusion”, and that
“[a]ssociations, judgments, suggestions, penetrate into every one of
our observations.”121  Additionally, he believed that the sources of
error in recollection began at the time of the observation, stating
that “the observation itself may be defective and illusory; wrong as-
sociations make it imperfect; judgments may misinterpret the expe-
rience; and suggestive influences may falsify the data of the
senses.”122
Munsterberg was the first major proponent of using psycholo-
gists in criminal cases to help juries understand the vagaries of eye-
witness identification.  Today, Elizabeth Loftus123 is probably the
most well-known expert on the strengths and weaknesses of eyewit-
ness testimony.124  In the Preface to the 2nd Edition of her 1979
book, Eyewitness Testimony, Loftus claims that prior to 1986 more
than one thousand people had been wrongfully convicted of a
crime, and some of those convicted were executed.125  Loftus firmly
believes evidence supports the finding that information acquired by
memory can subsequently be changed, and “that once memory for
some event is distorted by intervening events, the information ac-
quired during perception of the original event may never be re-
corded.”126  Additionally, Loftus contends that people can come to
believe they saw and heard things that never really happened127,
and largely unconsciously, use re-fabrication to fill in gaps of in-
complete memory.128  This led her to conclude: “According to the
old cliche´ – memory fades.  In fact, however, it grows! . . . Every
time we recall an event, we must reconstruct the memory, and so
each time it is changed, colored by succeeding events, increased
121. Id. at 33.
122. Id. at 56-57.
123. Elizabeth F. Loftus is the preeminent psychological authority in the field of
eyewitness testimony.  Dr. Loftus is the author of more that a dozen books and 150
scientific articles dealing with various aspects of perception, memory, and expression.
124. Hallisey, supra note 109, at 245.
125. ELIZABETH LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, vi (1996, 1979)
126. Id. at xiii.
127. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, MEMORY: SURPRISING INSIGHTS INTO HOW WE REMEMBER
AND WHY WE FORGET 39-40 (1980).
128. Id. at 40.
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understanding, a new context, suggestion by others, [and] other
people’s recollections.”129
The circumstances and factors that can affect the memory and
perception of an eyewitness, and the factors that are generally the
subject of expert testimony, were outlined by Loftus and her co-
author James Doyle in their book Eyewitness Testimony – Civil and
Criminal.130  The subject was divided between factors that deter-
mine perception and factors that determine the retention and re-
trieval of events.131
The factors determining perception were further split into two
categories: Event Factors and Witness Factors.132  Event factors are
factors inherent in an event itself,133 such as the lighting conditions
where an event occurs.  While it may seem obvious that we see bet-
ter in good rather than poor lighting or during the day rather than
at night, “the relationship between perception during good versus
poor lighting, and during daylight versus nighttime, is quite com-
plex.”134  For example, dark adaptation and light adaptation affect
perception.  When eyes are in lighted conditions but the conditions
abruptly become dark, the eyes go through dark adaptation.  The
opposite occurs with light adaptation.135  In either situation, full re-
covery of the eyes does not occur immediately.136  In dark adapta-
tion, it can take up to five minutes for the cones (the primary
mechanism for color vision) and thirty minutes for the rods (medi-
ate nighttime or low-intensity vision) to fully recover.  While this
time is significantly less in light adaptation, either situation can
have a profound affect on an eyewitness perception.137
129. Id. at 169.
130. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1992). See also, Roger V. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Iden-
tification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1018-1022 (1995).
See also Downing, 753 F.2d at 1224, 1229-31 (citing WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE,
§ 702.06[1][c]).
131. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 130 at vii-viii.
132. Id. at vii-viii.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id.
135. See YARMEY, supra note 110 at 39.  “A sudden change from light to dark or dark
to light requires an adjustment in chemical action between the rods and cones which
creates the momentary experience of ‘blindness.’” Id.
136. Id.
137. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 130, at 14-16.
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Violence is another significant event factor.138  If someone wit-
nesses a violent event, the violence can profoundly affect the wit-
ness’ ability not only to recall the event accurately, but also to recall
events that happened before the violent event.139  Some other event
factors that can affect perception are the duration of an event,
which may affect how well a witness can recall the event’s duration
or the speed at which it occurred; speed and distance, which relates
to how fast or how far away an event occurred; and colors, which
relates to a witness’ ability to perceive colors correctly.140
Witness factors, on the other hand, are factors that are inher-
ent in the witness herself.  One of the major witness factors is stress.
It is no surprise that an event that causes a very high level of stress
in a witness will affect that witness’ ability to perceive.  However, a
very low level of stress can also negatively affect perception because
the “nervous system may not be functioning fully.”141  This is known
as the Yerkes-Dodson Law, which posits that there is a level of stress
where performance will be optimal, but too little or too much will
impair performance.142  In addition, individuals handle stress dif-
ferently, and the effect stress can have depends on the individual
and the task at hand.  Therefore, even when stress is high, a person
may still correctly perform an easy, well-learned habit.143
Another important witness factor is the crime witness’ focus on
a weapon, which may reduce memory of other details of the
crime.144  Evidence of weapon focus is demonstrated by experi-
138. Id. at 24.
139. Id. at 24-25.  Loftus and Doyle cite many studies testing the effect of violence
or some other traumatic event on a person’s ability to perceive and remember that
event and events occurring soon before and after.  All of these studies yielded similar
results.
140. Id. at 17-23.
141. Id. at 31.
142. Dillickrath, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: Admissibility and Alterna-
tives, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1059, 1064 (2001) (citing ELIZABETH LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS IDEN-
TIFICATION (1979)).
143. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 130, at 31.
144. See Loftus, et al., Some Facts About “Weapons Focus,” 11 J. LAW & HUMAN BEHAV.
55 (1987).  Eighty-eight percent of expert psychologists interviewed believed the pres-
ence of a weapon interferes with a witness’s ability to remember the perpetrators face.
Id. at 55, citing studies.
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ments in which eye movements have been monitored while subjects
witness a scene where a weapon is involved.145
Expectation is another witness factor.146  A person may believe
she saw something that was not actually there because she expected
it to be.  Expectation is influenced by one’s biases and stereo-
types.147  In one famous study, subjects were shown an event in
which a black man and a white man were arguing.  The white man
was holding a razor.  When recalling the incident, many of the sub-
jects stated that the black man had the razor.148  Other witness fac-
tors may include age, sex, training or experience, and the influence
of drugs or alcohol.149
The factors determining the retention and retrieval of events
were also split into two categories: Retaining Events in Memory and
Retrieving Events from Memory.150  Forgetting is the biggest factor
affecting the retention of memory.  In 1885, Hermann Ebbinghaus
conducted a study on himself and invented the “forgetting
curve,”151 demonstrating that we forget a lot of new information
soon after we learn it.152  Forgetting then becomes more gradual.
145. Id. at 57-61 (discussing studies); see also MAASS & KOHNKEN, Eyewitness Identifica-
tion: Simulating the “Weapon Effect,” 13 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 397-408 (1989).
146. See Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?  Expert Psychological Testimony on the Un-
reliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977) (stating that “observers
make extensive use of expectancy, not only in developing strategies for determining
what to look at, but also in interpreting what they see.”). Id. at 980, citing Bruner, Social
Psychology and Perception, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 88-92 (3d ed. Maccoby,
Newcomb & Hartley eds., 1958); Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, SCIENTIFIC AM., Dec.
1974, at 23, reprinted in 15 JURIMETRICS J. 171 (1975); Haber, Nature of the Effect of Set on
Perception, 73 PSYCH. REV. 355 (1966).  In essence, witnesses unconsciously reconstruct
what has occurred from what they assume must have occurred.  Consequently, they
exhibit a pronounced tendency to perceive the expected.”  Woocher, supra, at 980.
147. Id. at 981  (citing Brigham, Ethnic Stereotypes, 76 PSYCH. BULL. 15 (1971);
Bruner, supra note 146, at 89-90; Campbell, The Stereotypes and the Perception of Group
Differences, 22 AM. PSYCH. 817 (1967)).
148. Id. 981, n.40 (citing ALLPORT & POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR (1947)).
149. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 130 at 40-51.
150. Id. at viii.
151. Id. at 55 (citing EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY: A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERIMENTAL PSY-
CHOLOGY (Dover 1964) (1885)).
152. Lane, Eyewitness Identification: Should Psychologists be Permitted to Address the Jury?,
75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1321, 1336 (1984) (citing Loftus, The Eyewitness on Trial,
16 TRIAL 31, 53 (1980)).
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Other studies all demonstrate that over time, our memory of an
event deteriorates.153
One reason we forget is that the information was never stored
in the first place.154  Another reason is that we do not want to re-
member bad experiences.155  Yet another reason is the effect of in-
terference or post-event information.  Often, when a witness to an
event is exposed to new information about the event, the new infor-
mation replaces the original memories of the event.156  As Loftus
and Doyle stated: “[t]here is extensive potential for this sort of erro-
neous supplementation in most (if not all) accident and criminal
cases.”157  Experts disagree about why post-event information affects
memory, but all agree that it does.158
Closely related to forgetting is distortion, which is generally af-
fected by four variables: “(1) the time interval between viewing and
recollecting an event; (2) the verbal form of post-event informa-
tion; (3) the violence in an event; and (4) whether there is any
warning that post-event information received is distorted.”159  Addi-
tionally, our own thoughts, desires, and beliefs can affect our mem-
ory and unconsciously distort our original memory of an event.160
153. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 130 at 56-59 (citing Linton, I Remember Well,
PSYCHOL. TODAY 81 (July 1979); Wagenaar & Groeneweg, The Memory of Concentration
Camp Survivors, 4 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 77-87 (1990); Bahrick, Memory for People,
in EVERYDAY MEMORY, ACTIONS, AND ABSENTMINDEDNESS 19 (Harris ed., 1983); Def-
fenbacher, On the Memorability of the Human Face, in ASPECTS OF FACE PROCESSING
(Nijhoff et al. eds., 1985)).
154. Id. at 60.
155. Id.
156. Woocher, supra note 146, at 983  (“The mind combines all the information
acquired about a particular event into a single storage ‘bin,’ making it difficult to distin-
guish what the witness saw originally from what she learned later.”).  (citing Baggett,
Memory for Explicit and Implicit Information in Picture Stories, 14 J. VERBAL LEARNING &
VERBAL BEHAVIOR 538 (1875); Buckhout, supra note 144; Loftus, Reconstructing Memory:
The Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Dec. 1974 at 119, reprinted in 15 JURIMETRICS
J. 188, 189 (1975).
157. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 130, at 62.
158. Id. at 67 (“The ‘alteration’ position is that post-event information alters the
original memory, the ‘coexistence’ position is that the original memory and the new
information exist together, but the original memory is now harder to reach, and the last
view is that post-event information does not affect underlying memory at all, only what
the witness reports.”).
159. Id. at 68.
160. Id. at 70-71.
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Forgetting and distortion affect the retention of memory, but
what happens when a witness must retrieve information from mem-
ory?  Both trial lawyers and social scientists recognize that retrieval
of information can be influenced by the method and wording of
questioning.161  This was known over 80 years ago,162 yet “very few
people are fully aware of how pervasive the influence of questions
can be.”163
A witness’ confidence in his or her recollection is also impor-
tant to the retrieval of information from memory.  A confident wit-
ness will likely be believed by a jury and will be harder to crack on
cross-examination.164  Studies suggest that eyewitness confidence is
not necessarily a good indicator of eyewitness accuracy.165  Further-
more, any competent trial lawyer will have her witness prepared to
testify at trial, adding to the witness’ confidence and thus masking
uncertainties.166  Juries tend to believe a confident eyewitness and
“convict on the basis of it.”167
Loftus and Doyle also discuss the particular problems associ-
ated with the identification of people.168  When identifying stran-
gers, “a number of interesting phenomena get in the way.”169  The
relationship between certain facial features and identifications is
one example.  Studies have shown that faces sharing three impor-
161. Id. 73-74. See also Woocher, supra note 146, at 984 n.55.
162. Id. at 74 (citing Musico, The Influence of the Form of Question, 8 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL.
351-86 (1916)).
163. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 130, at 74 (“Indeed, small changes in question
wording can result in dramatically different answers.”).
164. Id. at 75 (citing Wells et al., The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its Impli-
cations for Triers of Fact, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 688 (1981)).
165. See generally, Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can we Infer Any-
thing About Their Relationship?, 4 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 243 (1980) (discussing the rela-
tionship between confidence and accuracy and citing studies); Steven Penrod & Brian
Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCH.
POL. AND L. 817 (citing numerous studies demonstrating the lack of correlation be-
tween confidence and accuracy); see also Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 743-45 (discussing
published studies)).
166. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 130, at 76.
167. Id. at 86 (citing Frazzini, Review of Eyewitness Testimony, 70 YALE REV. xviii
(1981)).
168. Id. at 85.
169. Id. at 88 (citing CLIFFORD & BULL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSON IDENTIFICATION
(1978); SHEPARD et al., IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION
(1982)).
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tant features are often misidentified.170  These features are age
(young, fresh faces versus older, lined faces), facial shape (long,
oval faces versus round, pudgy faces), and hair (short, close
cropped hair versus long, straggly hair).171  Thus, two faces with dif-
ferent features such as mouth and eyes could be confused with each
other if similarities exist as to age, shape, and hair.172  Research has
also shown that although a witness may give a detailed description
of a face from memory, the same witness may not be able to accu-
rately identify the face at a later date.173  Such findings are contrary
to popular belief, including that of the Supreme Court.174
A final problem with the recognition of people is cross-racial
identifications.175  Research demonstrates that people have diffi-
culty recognizing individual members of a race different from one’s
own.176  Possible explanations are different experiences with mem-
170. Id. at 89 (citing Davies, et al., Wanted – Faces That Fit the Bill, NEW SCIENTIST 26-
29 (May 16, 1985); Green & Geiselman, Building Composite Facial Images: Effects of Feature
Saliency and Delay of Construction, 74 APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714 (1989)).
171. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 130, at 89.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 90, citing Pigott & Brigham, The Relationship Between Accuracy of Prior
Description and Facial Recognition, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 547-55 (1985) (subjects who
gave accurate descriptions of a “culprit” were no better at later recognizing the culprit
than subjects who gave poor descriptions).
174. Id. at 89-90 (comparing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) with Pigott &
Brigham, supra note 173).  In Neil, the Court upheld an identification in a suggestive
“show-up” of a suspect because the victim had a good opportunity to view the suspect
and her description to the police was “more than ordinarily thorough.” Neil, 409 U.S.
at 200.
175. See, e.g., Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifica-
tions, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2001); Sporer, Special Theme: The Other-Race Effect and Con-
temporary Criminal Justice: Eyewitness Identification and Jury Decision Making: Eyewitness
Identification: The Cross-Race Effect: Beyond Recongnition of Faces in the Laboratory, 7 PSYCH.
PUB. POL. AND L. 170 (March 2001); Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal
Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984).
176. See Rutledge, supra note 175, at 211 (“The last half-century’s empirical studies
of cross racial IDs has shown that eyewitnesses have difficulty identifying members of
another race. . .” citing Platz & Hosch, Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field
Study, 18 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 972 (1988), GARY L. WELLS & ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1984)); see also Sporer, supra note
175, at 170 (“Differences in accuracy rates for recognizing faces of one’s own and other
ethnic group have been well documented in the psychological literature. . .There is
consensus among psychological experts. . .that the cross-race effect is a sufficiently reli-
able phenomenon.”  Citing numerous published studies.).
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bers of another race, prejudicial attitudes, or different modes of
processing faces of a different race.177
It is particularly important that a jury be informed of all of
these problems with eyewitness testimony before sending a person
to prison.  As Judge McCree stated in United States v. Russell,178 “of
all the evidence that may be presented to a jury, a witness’ in-court
statement that ‘he is the one’ is probably the most dramatic and
persuasive.”179
IV. CHANGING THE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
Using Frye to test the admissibility of expert testimony on eye-
witness reliability leads to inconsistent results and keeps important
evidence from a jury.  In Daubert, the Supreme Court denoted the
“rigid general acceptance” standard of Frye, making it only one of
several factors to consider. Daubert adopted standards for admitting
expert testimony that are in touch with the “liberal thrust” of the
Federal Rules and their “general approach of relaxing the tradi-
tional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.”180
Frye may deprive a jury of relevant evidence181 because the “rel-
evance of novel scientific evidence does not hinge on its ‘general
acceptance’ in the scientific community.”182  In addition, courts ap-
177. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note, 130 at 99; see also Rutledge, supra note 175, at 208
(stating that “stereotyping and prejudice seem to affect [witness’s] reports.”) citing
MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 175 (1978); Hallisey,
supra note 109, at 238. (“Individual experience is not recorded on a clean slate; rather,
it is immediately interpreted against the background of the observer’s experience, bi-
ases, prejudices and preconceptions.”).
178. 532 F.2d. 1063 (6th Cir. 1976).
179. Id. at 1067.
180. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. at
169).
181. Thus, when the sole or primary evidence against a defendant is the testimony
of an eyewitness, whether that testimony is reliable is certainly relevant. See, e.g.,
Legrand, 747 N.Y.S. at 742.  The only evidence was the testimony of eyewitnesses, the
court stated that there was “no question as to whether the proffered expert testimony is
relevant to the issues and facts of this case.”
182. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1235 (stating that “some scientific evidence [that] can
assist the trier of fact in reaching an accurate determination of facts in issue even
though the principles underlying the evidence have not become ‘generally accepted’ in
the field to which they belong.”); see also, State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 503 (1978).
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plying the Frye test may admit expert testimony that “derives from
inaccurate or unreliable principles or techniques.”183  As the Alaska
Supreme Court stated: “Frye. . .excludes scientifically reliable evi-
dence which is not yet generally accepted, and admits scientifically
unreliable evidence which although generally accepted, cannot
meet rigorous scientific scrutiny.”184  Courts can also limit the im-
pact of Frye in various ways, including by narrowing the relevant
scientific community in which the evidence needs to be “generally
accepted.”185  Finally, courts have argued that Frye “provides a
method by which courts can assess the reliability of novel scientific
expert testimony.”186  The vagueness of general acceptance, how-
ever, can create problems in applying the test.187
A. Reinterpreting Frye
Reinterpreting Frye is one way to facilitate the admission of ex-
pert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony.  Courts
might simply declare Frye inapplicable to such testimony or con-
clude that the research underlying such testimony is generally ac-
cepted.  Either interpretation would allow New York to continue to
adhere to Frye, while permitting expert testimony in cases where
witness identification is the sole or major evidence against a crimi-
nal defendant.188
(Maine Supreme Court interpreting Maine’s rules of evidence, based on the Federal
Rules, as not incorporating Frye); Woocher, supra note 146, at 1017-18 (“[D]epriving
jurors of the benefit of scientific research on eyewitness testimony force[s] them to
search for the truth without full knowledge and opportunity to evaluate the strength of
the evidence.”).
183. Downing, 753 F.2d. at 1236 n.14 (citing Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197,
1224-26 (1980) (describing the “general acceptance” of the “paraffin test” for detecting
gunshot residue before any scientific testing had established the test as reliable)).
184. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 393-94 (Alaska 1999).
185. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 331 P.2d 251 (Cal. App. Dep’t. Super. Ct. 1958)
(the court held the Frye test was satisfied upon a showing of general acceptance by those
who are expected to be familiar with the technique of testing for narcotics, although
the government’s own expert conceded the lack of acceptance in the medical profes-
sion generally); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (1978) (noting the im-
pact of selecting the “relevant scientific community” in applying the Frye test).
186. Downing, 753 F.2d. at 1235; see also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-
44 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
187. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 183, at 1208-28.
188. For example, the Court could issue a holding like the one in the McDonald
case.  See McDonald, 690 P.2d at 727 ( “When an eyewitness identification of the defen-
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Holding Frye inapplicable to such testimony would be consis-
tent with the purpose of Frye. Frye was concerned about novel scien-
tific principles,189 not the testimony of a doctor who will “merely
describe academic research and writings in a recognized field of
study and discuss the factors in [a case] which may affect the ability
to identify accurately.”190  The testimony of an expert regarding the
reliability of an eyewitness does not depend on any novel scientific
experiment or discovery, rather it “describes observations and stud-
ies by a wide range of scholars who have observed and examined
cognizable behavioral patterns connected with the accuracy of eye-
witness testimony.”191  Many other forms of expert testimony that
do not depend on novel scientific principles are admissible in New
York courts without a Frye hearing.192
The New York Court of Appeals or the state legislature could
also decide that the science underlying expert testimony about eye-
witness identification is generally accepted.  In light of all the litera-
ture and studies on this topic discussed above, the psychological
factors that may affect an eyewitness’ memory and perception are
arguably generally accepted.193
dant is a key element of the prosecution’s case but is not substantially corroborated by
evidence giving it independent reliability, and the defendant [offers an expert to testify
about the factors that can affect the eyewitness’ identification], it will. . . be error to
exclude that testimony.”).
189. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (“The court itself stated that it was concerned about scien-
tific principles or discoveries that “cross the line between the experimental and
demonstrable.”).
190. Smith, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1990) (allowing expert testi-
mony regarding rape trauma syndrome because it was relevant to dispel misconceptions
regarding ordinary responses of rape victims); People v. Brown, 769 N.E.2d 1266 (N.Y.
2002) (permitting expert testimony regarding the practices and terminology in street
level narcotics transactions because it was helpful to the jury in understanding the evi-
dence presented). See also People v. Ciervo, 506 N.Y.S.2d 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(permitting the defense to call an expert in the field of psychology to testify as to bat-
tered woman’s syndrome); In re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 1987) (a therapist was
permitted to testify regarding sexually abused child syndrome); People v. Keindl, 502
N.E.2d 577, 583, appeal denied, 506 N.E.2d 539 (1987) (a psychiatrist was allowed to
testify at trial to explain how children who have been repeatedly sexually abused by
their stepfather are likely to suffer psychologically).
193. See Smith, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 249 (citing other cases holding that the general ac-
ceptance standard was satisfied).
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B. Adopting Daubert
Adopting Daubert as the standard for all expert evidence in
New York is also a good solution, but this might encounter opposi-
tion from those who think Daubert is too lenient.  While allowing
experts to testify about the problems with eyewitness testimony will
benefit defendants, Daubert can also help prosecutors.194  Recent
decisions from various state Supreme Courts demonstrate that
adopting Daubert would maintain standards while making expert
testimony more easily admissible.195  .
People v. Legrand, which excluded expert testimony on eyewit-
ness identification, would likely have been decided differently
under Daubert.  In Legrand, the defense sought to introduce an ex-
pert to testify as to: (1) the confidence-accuracy correlation; (2)
post-event information and confidence malleability; and (3)
weapon focus.196  The trial judge held the testimony regarding all
three psychological theories inadmissible, stating, as to the confi-
dence-accuracy theory, that the “correlation has not yet achieved
general acceptability within the relevant scientific community.”197
It is likely such testimony would have been admitted if the court
had applied Daubert.  First, the proposed testimony was obviously
194. See, e.g., Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (prosecution was permitted to use expert on spec-
trographic techniques to prove defendant was the person making threatening phone
calls); Schreck, 22 P.3d 68 (prosecution allowed to use DNA evidence under Daubert);
United States v. Plaza, 188 F.Supp. 2d 549 (2002) (allowing the government to call as
experts FBI fingerprint specialists).
195. See Coon, 974 P.2d at 395 (adopting Daubert to allow the expert testimony of an
expert on spectrographic techniques which was excluded under Frye).  The court
stated: “We adopt the Daubert standard for determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence.  We hold that the voice spectrograph analysis evidence was admissible under
Daubert and the Alaska Rules of Evidence in this case.  We therefore affirm Coon’s judg-
ment and conviction.” Id. at 402-03. See also People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (2001) (over-
turning the exclusion of DNA evidence because it did not meet Frye after adopting
Daubert and applying it to the facts); Ex parte State of Alabama (Re: Andre Dwight
Turner v. State), 746 So.2d 355 (1998) (overturning the exclusion of DNA evidence
under Frye and admitting the evidence using Daubert); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512 (Ark. 2000) (adopting Daubert and abandoning Frye to reject ex-
pert testimony regarding a trained canines ability to indicate whether a fire was inten-
tionally set).
196. All of these are discussed in Section II(B).
197. See Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
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relevant to the case.198  Second, the testimony was reliable as ana-
lyzed under Daubert.  The “key question,” as Daubert stated, is
whether the theory can be and has been tested.199  The confidence-
accuracy correlation is a theory that has been and can be tested.200
The theory has also been the subject of extensive peer review and
publication.201  Not only is there extensive writing in support of the
theory, there is writing opposed to the theory as well.202
Additionally, Daubert stated that the court “should consider the
known or potential rate of error.”203  The government’s expert tes-
tified that because different methods are used to test the theory the
results could vary greatly.204  This merely means that under varying
conditions different results may occur, not that there is a high po-
tential rate of error.  Many psychologists believe that regardless of
the different possible conditions, the correlation between confi-
dence and accuracy is still very low.205  Finally, “ ‘general accept-
ance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.”206  But, even if the
198. The relevancy was acknowledged by the judge, who stated, because the eyewit-
ness testimony is central to the prosecution’s case-in-chief and there is no other cor-
roborating evidence, that there “is also no question as to whether the proffered expert
testimony is relevant to the issues and facts of this case.” Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
199. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
200. Even the State’s expert, who testified against the confidence-accuracy correla-
tion, acknowledged that there were three methods psychologists used to test this theory.
Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
201. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations
for Lineups and Photospreads, LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, vol. 22, no. 6, 1-39, at 14
(1998); Saul M. Kassin, et. al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research:
A New Survey of the Experts, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST (2001); Michael R. Leippe, The Case
for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, Psychology, 1 PUBLIC POLICY AND LAW no. 4,
909 (1995).
202. McKenna, J. et al., Expert Psychological Testimony About Eyewitness Reliability: Sell-
ing Psychology Before its Time, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY, 283-93 (1992); Lindsay et
al., Accuracy and Confidence in Person Identification: The Relationship is Strong When Witness-
ing Conditions Vary Widely, 9 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE  215 (1998).
203. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
204. Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
205. Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, PSY-
CHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE LAW, vol. 1, no. 4, 909-59, 927 (“[even under] the
most pristine conditions [confidence-accuracy correlation] only tends to be about
.40”).
206. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
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confidence-accuracy correlation is not generally accepted, the testi-
mony could still be admissible.207
It is clear that Daubert would not only provide trial courts with a
reasonable standard to control the admissibility of expert testi-
mony, it would ensure that relevant and reliable evidence would be
admissible to assist a jury in making its decision.  Defendants could
then be protected from the prejudice of potentially unreliable testi-
mony.  Traditional safeguards would still exist to protect a party
against whom an expert is testifying.  As the Supreme Court stated,
in responding to fears that abandonment of “general acceptance
would lead to a ‘free-for-all:’”
[r]espondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about
the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system
generally.  Vigorous cross examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden
of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of at-
tacking shaky but admissible evidence.208
Additionally, an expert will only testify to the general problems that
can affect the memory and perception of an eyewitness.  He would
not be permitted to state a conclusion as to whether the particular
witness in question actually suffered from any of these problems.209
V. CONCLUSION
New York has lagged behind most of the States and the federal
government in admitting expert testimony about eyewitness relia-
bility.  By either reinterpreting Frye or by adopting Daubert, New
York can make such testimony available to criminal defendants.  No
person should be deprived of his liberty solely on the basis of eye-
witness testimony unless the jury is fully aware of the ways in which
such testimony may be flawed.
207. The judge in Legrand stated that some of the experts who studied confidence-
accuracy could not state their opinion to a “reasonable degree of scientific certainty.”
Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 745.  However, as the Supreme Court said in its holding in
Daubert, “arguably, there are no certainties in science.” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96.
208. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96.  (Also, “[a]s is true with all expert testimony, the
jury remains free to reject it entirely after considering the expert’s opinion.”). See Mc-
Donald, 37 Cal.3d at 722.
209. See, e.g., McDonald, 690 P.2d at 722-23; Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1219.
